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Abstract
In many European countries, populist right-wing parties have been most noticeable representatives of Euroscepticism. In
Finland, the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) has been a constant promoter of organisational Euroscepticism through its
leader, Timo Soini. The party broke through in Finland’s ‘big bang elections’ of 2011, when the most debated issue was the
European economic crisis, which was dominated by Eurosceptic Soini. Research concerning the relationship between the
media, populism and Euroscepticism usually focus on national or European Parliament elections. This study analyses the
media portrayal of the Eurosceptic Finns Party during times other than elections, focusing on the Finland’s overall Euro
crisis press coverage in 2010–2012. The analysis shows that the populist Finns Party has been a minor player in that cov-
erage, which was dominated by the Euro positive political and economic elites. Differences between newspapers indicate
that journalistic routines and political context direct media coverage toward particular framings, even when the media
proclaims itself politically independent and neutral.
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1. Introduction
Opposition to immigration and ethnic minorities can be
described as the main themes unifying extreme right
movements, however, populist right-wing parties have
also promoted Euroscepticism (Caiani & Conti, 2014;
Mudde, 2007; Pirro, 2014). Hooghe, Marks and Wilson
(2002) conclude this is because European integration
combines several supposed threats—immigrants; exter-
nal political and cultural influences; and European laws—
which populist right-wing parties perceive as undermin-
ing national sovereignty (pp. 976–977). Thus, the Euro-
peanUnion (EU) and its institutions constitute a symbolic
enemy to right-wing populistmovements (Caiani & Conti,
2014, pp. 186–188).
Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002, p. 31) noted that Eu-
rosceptic parties are generally small and gain relatively
low shares in national elections, making their political in-
fluencemarginal. This might have been true at the begin-
ning of the new millennium. However, since the expan-
sion of the international financial crisis into a European
debt and currency crisis in year 2008, Eurosceptic senti-
ment inmany European countries has increased (Pew Re-
search, 2013). The simultaneous increase in internal and
external migrants in the EU has helped populist parties
strengthen their political influence, allowing them into
government in many countries.
Since the political and economic establishment has
generally promoted the benefits of European integration,
populist parties have been the most eager representa-
tives of Euroscepticism in their domestic arenas. This is
true for the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset [PS], previ-
ously True Finns), a constant promoter of organisational
Euroscepticism through its leader, Timo Soini. Even if
there have been some exceptions depending on their
government-opposition status of themoment, in general
Finnish mainstream parties are favourable to European
integration in comparison to their rank and file (Raunio,
2011, p. 204). Hence, PS’s consistent Euroscepticism has
been a defining image of the party.
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The Nordic party system has been identified as ‘en-
during’ (Sundberg, 1999), but the Euro currency crisis
has challenged it in Finland. The crisis is purported to
be a main reason behind the ‘big bang election’ of 2011
(Arter, 2012), in which PS gained 19.1 percent of the vote,
becoming the third largest party in the Finnish parlia-
ment (see Borg, 2012). According to the research, the Eu-
ropean economic crisis became themost important topic
in election campaign debates (Railo & Välimäki, 2012a)
and PS and Soini challenged the more established can-
didates, dominating agenda setting during the election
campaigns (Pernaa, 2012, pp. 35-38; Railo & Välimäki,
2012b, pp. 120–135).
However, the election campaignwas a specific period
in the relationship between Finland’s political parties
and the media. Similar specific periods have been found
throughout Europe because research into Eurosceptics
has concentrated on electoral campaigns (Schuck et al.,
2011; Silke & Maier, 2011; Strömbäck et al., 2011; Van
Spanje & De Vreese, 2014), and therefore PS studies
have focused precisely on the ‘big bang election’ of 2011
(Arter, 2012; Borg, 2012; Rahkonen, 2011;Wiberg, 2011).
Additionally, PS gained success in the 2015 parliamen-
tary elections, gaining 17.7 percent of the vote and en-
tering into government for the first time.
EU issues are especially prominent during election
campaigns in countries with Eurosceptic parties (see
Silke &Maier, 2011), althoughmedia analysis of the Euro
crisis coverage reveals the portrayal of the crisis is domi-
nated by elites in favour of the Euro rather than Euroscep-
tics (Picard, 2015). To redress that focus on election pe-
riods, this study examines the role of PS’s media cover-
age outside of electoral periods, namely the Euro crisis.
Secondly, most studies indicate thatmedia elites are gen-
erally more favourable to mainstream political parties
upholding the political status quo, whereas the tabloid
media is more ‘populist’ and promotes divisive politics
(Leconte, 2010, p. 195; Mazzoleni, 2003, p. 8). Thus, it is
worth exploring if there is difference between the quality
and the tabloid media’s portrayal of PS when referring to
the Euro crisis.
The research questions (RQ) of the study are as
follows:
RQ1. How has the Finns Party (PS) been portrayed in the
Finnish press coverage of the Euro crisis?
RQ2. How does the portrayal differ compared to the cov-
erage of the ‘big bang elections’ of 2011?
RQ3. What does the portrayal reveal about the rela-
tionship between the press and populist movements
in general?
The data for the study has been collected as part of the
large international research project that compared the
press coverage of the Euro crisis in ten EU countries (Pi-
card, 2015). The sample consists of 11 two-week periods
between the years 2010 and 2012 and contains articles
from the leading quality newspaper, the leading popular
paper, the leading financial paper, and the most promi-
nent regional paper in Northern Finland. The main study
method is quantitative and qualitative frame analysis.
2. Euroscepticism and the Media
Even if Leconte (2010) has demonstrated in her book
Understanding Euroscepticism that ‘the perceptions of
the EU are largely influenced by issues apparently unre-
lated to European integration, such as citizens’ percep-
tion of national democracy, immigration, multicultural-
ism and so on’ (pp. 246–247), Euroscepticism has most
often been linked to doubts or distrust of the EU and its
bodies and regulative power. The central position of the
EU in Euroscepticism is because EU institutions and regu-
lation are central to the debate over national sovereignty
and European integration since the 1990s (Caiani &Conti,
2014, pp. 186–187). Populist radical right-wing move-
ments have adopted Euroscepticism to critique globali-
sation (Mudde, 2007).
It is possible to classify different levels or dimensions
of Euroscepticism (e.g. Leconte, 2010, pp. 43–67). If we
accept the definition of Euroscepticism as being the dis-
trust of the EU, Euroscepticism can become organised by
political parties ormovements critical of the EU, or itmay
appear as general dissatisfaction among EU citizens. Eu-
roscepticism can also be either strong and principled—
opposing EU membership or the union itself, or it can
refer to weaker (soft) resistance on specific questions in
which the interests of some member states conflict with
EU regulation (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002).
Euroscepticism has been strong, for example, in the
UK. Taylor (2008) has crystallised a common EU theme
found in British discussions: EU is far too expensive, ‘Eu-
rocratic’ and self-serving, which prevents a reasonable
agricultural policy; meddles with subjects it should not,
such as domestic employment, health and security poli-
cies; and increases undesired immigration, resulting in
social tensions in member states (pp. 34–35). In general,
British Euroscepticism has mostly been focused on Eu-
ropean Monetary Union (EMU) (Lubbers & Scheepers,
2005, p. 228) and on immigration (Luedtke, 2005). Simi-
lar arguments have been presented in other EU countries
too (Caiani & Conti, 2014), but in the UK attitudes against
the EU led to Brexit in the July of 2016.
Therefore, Euroscepticism varies between countries
(Leconte, 2010, p. 99).Whereas Euroscepticism has been
strong in the UK both among citizens and policy-makers,
France has traditionally been a ‘Europhilic’ country repre-
senting a positive attitude towards European integration.
Euroscepticism has been strong in the Nordic countries,
albeit weaker in Finland than in Sweden, Norway and
Denmark—countries not in the EMU (Ekman, 2010, pp.
108–119). In addition to Eurosceptic and Europhile ex-
tremes, it is also possible to define ‘critical Europeanist’
countries such as the Netherlands in which the attitude
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towards European integration has been generally posi-
tive, although the attitude towards EU institutions is neg-
ative (Koopmans, Erbe, & Meyer, 2010, pp. 91–92).
According to various surveys, Euroscepticism among
EU citizens has increased during the last twenty years (Eu-
robarometer, 2015; Leconte, 2010, p. 161; Pew Research,
2013). Support for the EU was highest in the early 1990s,
but by the beginning of the newmillennium support had
declined remarkably, for example, in the Netherlands,
France and Italy, where the attitude towards European
integration had been very positive (Caiani & Conti, 2014,
p. 184; Taylor, 2008, pp. 26–27). In many countries, dis-
trust has confronted the attitudes of the establishment
and ruling parties, which have generally promoted Euro-
pean integration. This, in turn, has created space for pop-
ulist political parties that apply Eurosceptic rhetoric (Ca-
iani & Conti, 2014, p. 184; Ekman, 2010, p. 92).
Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) claim that Eurosceptic
parties will likely succeed in countries with multi-polar
competition between the parties than in countries with
bi-polar competition because, inmulti-polar systems, pe-
ripheral parties can benefit from second-order issues,
such as European integration, when differentiating them-
selves from more established parties (pp. 34–35). In ad-
dition, Paloheimo (2012) emphasises that populist par-
ties have been especially successful in countries tradi-
tionally reliant on consensus in policy-making because
the establishment is easily labelled a ‘corrupt elite’ by
populists (p. 329).
Finnish EU policy has been based on consensus
among established political parties, even if conflicts
within parties on EU questions have appeared (Raunio,
2011, p. 198). This has opened a door through which the
populist PS can act as a Eurosceptic voice, seducing vot-
ers. In addition to the structural transformation of indus-
tries and scandals concerning election campaign fund-
ing in Finland, Euroscepticism, containing distrust of and
protest sentiment against established parties, has been
shown to be one of the main reasons for PS’s success in
the ‘big bang elections’ of 2011 (e.g. Borg, 2012; Grön-
lund & Westinen, 2012; Rahkonen, 2011).
Studies of the European Parliament (EP) elections of
2009 indicated that there is a correlation between the
media portrayal of the EU and the election results: in
countries with strong Eurosceptic parties, the negative
portrayal of the EU has beenmore common than in other
countries (Silke & Maier, 2011; Van Spanje & De Vreese,
2014). However, there were significant differences be-
tween the countries. In the 2009 EP election, the pro-
EU frame dominated, for example, Italian, German and
Finnish media coverage, whereas the anti-EU frame was
strong in the Czech, Danish and UK media (Strömbäck
et al., 2011, p. 171). In general, a negative tone on EU
issues was more common than positive (Schuck et al.,
2011, p. 177)—also in Finland and other Nordic coun-
tries (Schuck et al., 2011, p. 184). However, the EU was
framed as beneficial in all other countries, except the
UK, Austria and Czech Republic—the most prominent
representatives of Euroscepticism (Schuck et al., 2011,
pp. 186–187).
Thus, media coverage commonly portrays the EU as
beneficial for the member states but regards EU institu-
tions as reducing individual member state’s democracy
and sovereignty (Schuck et al., 2011, p. 193). This re-
flects discussions on the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’, deriv-
ing from the disparity between Europe’s institutional de-
velopment and national public spheres as core arenas of
political debate (Koopmans, 2007, p. 183; Leconte, 2010,
p. 209; Schuck et al., 2011, p. 175). The European Com-
mission has responded to the challenge with a strategic
increase in transparency and public discussion (De Beus,
2010, p. 26; Heikkilä, 2007). However, as Hix (2008) re-
minds us, publicity strategies cannot bridge the gap be-
tween the European elites and European citizens if there
are no real possibilities to challenge predominant policy-
making at the EU level (p. 64).
The problem from the media’s perspective has been
that the mainstream European media have made the
Euro elites their main source when discussing EU ques-
tions and issues, whereas the Eurosceptic views of those
who have less political power have been marginalised
(Koopmans, 2007). In Finland, journalists, on the whole,
supported joining the EU more than the average citizen
(Mörä, 1999). However, Finland has been an EUmember
state for over 20 years and the Euro crisis has seriously
challenged the country’s economy since 2012. Thus, the
opinions and attitudes of journalists may have changed.
In the coverage of the 2009 EP election the tone towards
the EU was generally more positive in newer member
states than in older ones, indicating that there is a ‘hon-
eymoon period’ (Schuck et al., 2011, p. 185).
Trenz (2007) has demonstrated that the quality press
has, in general, promoted European integration and
been EU positive. However, soft versions of Euroscepti-
cism are quite common also in the quality press (Leconte,
2010, pp. 197, 218). Several studies indicate that the
tabloid media adopts a Eurosceptic discourse more ea-
gerly than the quality media and repeats the so-called
‘Euro myths’, especially in countries as the UK and Aus-
tria, which are known from their strong Eurosceptic sen-
timent (Leconte, 2010, pp. 195, 203–204). It is alsoworth
acknowledging that Web-based communication and so-
cial media play significant roles in today’s Eurosceptic
mobilisation (Leconte, 2010, pp. 206–208). This is espe-
cially true with right-wing populist movements, whose
supporters eagerly link the mainstream media to the lib-
eral and corrupt elites and therefore strengthen their
group identities via their own social media sites (Herk-
man, 2016).
3. Materials and Methods
The data here derive from a large comparative research
project ‘The Euro Crisis, Media Coverage, and Percep-
tions of Europe within the EU’ organised by the Reuters
Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of
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Oxford (see Picard, 2015). The newspaper materials of
the project were collected from ten EU countries: the UK,
France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Greece, Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Poland and Finland. The sample consists of articles
that discuss the Euro crisis. The articles were gathered
from four newspapers from each country during 11 two-
week periods during 2010 to 2012. The selected newspa-
pers included the leading liberal and conservative quality
dailies, business or financial papers and tabloid or popu-
lar papers. The sampling periods were built around the
‘key moments’ of the crisis, including the EU summits
in 2010, 2011 and 2012 as well as the Eurozone mem-
bers’ and the International Monetary Fund’s agreement
for the 100 billion euro loan for Greece on 2 May 2010
(Picard, 2015, pp. 269–273).
The sample included all journalistic articles such
as news stories, editorials, interviews, feature stories,
columns and commentaries published during the sample
periods. However, letters to the editors were excluded
from the sample. The coding book contained variables
that considered the basic data of the articles, e.g., the
size of the story, genre, author; the main topics and
sources used in the articles; the main causes; responses;
actors, winners and losers of the crisis—if there were
any—as well as the geopolitical frame and portrayal of
the EU institutions presented in the articles (Picard, 2015,
pp. 273–293). In total, 10,492 articles were coded and
analysed in the project.
In Finland, as in other Nordic countries, it is diffi-
cult to define newspapers according to the liberal/con-
servative axis since there is no such kind of political ori-
entation in the Nordic newspaper field. Thus, Finnish
dailies chosen for the sampling were the leading newspa-
per of the country Helsingin Sanomat, traditionally sym-
pathetic towards European integration and Europhilic
elites; the leading regional paper of northern Finland
Kaleva, traditionally more critical towards EU and the Eu-
rophilic metropolitan elites; the leading business paper
Kauppalehti; and the most popular tabloid Ilta-Sanomat.
The Finnish sample contained 971 articles discussing the
Euro crisis (see Harjuniemi & Herkman, 2013, p. 15). The
coding of the sample was carried out by two trained re-
search assistants, whose inter-coder reliability was 0.78
according to the Holsti formula.
The coding book was supplemented for this study by
variables exploring how much and in what way PS was
portrayed in Euro crisis articles (Harjuniemi & Herkman,
2013, p. 83). Only 61 Euro crisis articles, meaning six per-
cent of the Finnish sample, mentioned PS. Two of the 61
articles did not actually discuss the expected topic and
were thus excluded from the materials. Therefore, 59
articles remained from the larger sample of the Finnish
Euro crisis coverage and were taken for qualitative frame
analysis; 20 from Kaleva, 18 from Helsingin Sanomat, 15
from Ilta-Sanomat and only six from Kauppalehti.
The roots of frame analysis lay in Goffman’s (1974)
ideas on social experience, but since the 1980s the frame
analysis has been applied by media studies and become
one of the most popular methods of journalism studies
(Borah, 2011). The definition of the ‘frame’ varies de-
pending on the study, but usually it refers to the possi-
ble framings restricting or directing interpretations (Van
Spanje & De Vreese, 2014, p. 327). In journalism studies,
framing refers to the processes in which the media em-
phasises someparts of reality andhides others by putting
certain views to the fore of an article, thereby endorsing
a particular interpretation (Entman, 1993, p. 53).
The frame analysis separates media frames from au-
dience frames. The former is framing that the media car-
ries out in portraying various topics, actors and phenom-
ena, whereas the latter is the way audiences receive and
interpret media texts (De Vreese, Jochen, & Holli, 2001,
p. 107). In political studies, the frame analysis is also used
to comprehend the construction of political ideas and
identities (e.g. Caiani & Conti, 2014, p. 185). In this study,
the focus is solely on media frames that are studied with
reference to how the Finnish press framed PS in the
Euro crisis articles. The main frames are found by sifting
through sentences in which PS or its representatives are
mentioned and by reflecting on how PS was presented in
comparison with the context of the whole article.
4. Finns Party and Coverage of the Euro Crisis
According to election studies, the economic crisis in the
EU region became the most popular topic of television
debates and newspaper articles during the campaigns of
Finnish elections in 2011, a debate led by the Eurosceptic
PS (Railo & Välimäki, 2012a, pp. 36, 53–57). However, de-
bates on the Euro crisis appear to have had two phases.
In the first phase, themedia were highly critical of the EU
institutions’ and Finland’s official policy during the crisis.
However, after Portugal’s government fell on 23 March
2011 because of the crisis, the Finnish media started to
support Finland’s official EU policy and sought a new eco-
nomic consensus (Railo, 2012, p. 258–261). Thus, the sig-
nificance of Euroscepticism faded during the campaigns
once the crisis worsened.
The period of the ‘big bang elections’ and the col-
lapse of Portugal’s government are not included in the
sample of this study. The sample contains the period be-
fore the spring of 2011, during which the EU Contract
was changed on 16 December 2010, and the period after
spring 2011, when the European Central Bank asked Italy
for more austerity measures on 5 August 2011 (Picard,
2015, pp. 269–272). Therefore, thematerial here focuses
on the coverage of the Euro crisis specifically from the
point of view of the crisis not from the Finnish elections.
As mentioned, only six percent of the Euro crisis ar-
ticles mentioned PS and not all of those articles pro-
moted a Eurosceptic approach. Thus, it seems that PS
gained only modest publicity at times other than elec-
tions. In contrast, the media coverage of the crisis was
dominated by domestic and European political leaders,
with economists often representing EU positive ‘Euro
elites’ (Harjuniemi, Herkman, & Ojala, 2015; Herkman &
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Harjuniemi, 2015). The leader of PS, Timo Soini, was of-
ten quoted in Finnish Euro crisis articles, but less than
the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance or the
EU’s Financial Commissioner, Olli Rehn, and economists
and other EU officials (Harjuniemi & Herkman, 2013,
pp. 21–29). Therefore, it is clear that PS did not define
the Finnish media agenda during the Euro crisis.
However, since the ‘big bang elections’ made PS a le-
gitimate debater on the Euro crisis, almost all the Euro
crisis articles that mention PS were published after the
2011 elections. In fact, only six articles were published
before the elections. Thus, PS’s higher proportional share
of media attention came after the election period. Fur-
thermore, as the economic recession has become more
topical since then, the continuing media spotlight on
Euroscepticism has slightly strengthened (Harjuniemi &
Herkman, 2013, p. 19).
The Finnish press discussed the Euro crisis mostly as
an economic issue to be covered by the business or fi-
nancial sections of the papers (Harjuniemi & Herkman,
2013, p. 24). This also explains why PS was mentioned so
infrequently and mostly in a negative light by the busi-
ness paper Kauppalehti (see Table 1). Kauppalehti ap-
proached the crisis as an economic issue andmostly used
economists and bankers for its sources. The other pa-
pers mentioned PS three times more often in their Euro
crisis articles than Kauppalehti because they discussed
the political dimensions of the crisis. The leading daily,
Helsingin Sanomat, mentioned PS in six percent of its
Euro crisis articles and generally gave more visibility to
PS thanKauppalehti.Helsingin Sanomat also approached
PS quite neutrally in its news journalism.
As a percentage of all Euro crisis stories, PS was most
often mentioned in Ilta-Sanomat, in which 12 percent of
all Euro crisis stories discussed the party or Soini. In addi-
tion, Ilta-Sanomatwasmost positive in its portrayal of PS,
since only two of its articles clearly criticised the party.
This indicates that Ilta-Sanomat adopted the most visi-
ble Eurosceptic approach. The paper also gave increased
visibility to PS by publishing impressive images of Soini.
Helsingin Sanomat and Kaleva published fewer images
of him. In many ways, Kaleva was the antithesis of Ilta-
Sanomat in its portrayal of PS; even though Kalevamen-
tioned PS quite frequently, the party was repeatedly dis-
cussed in a negative light and even downplayed.
Different assessments can be partly explained by
the article types. In Kaleva and Kauppalehti PS was
mentioned quite often in editorials and commentaries—
article types in which critical statements are common—
whereas in Helsingin Sanomat and in Ilta-Sanomat PS
wasmore often discussed in news stories that emphasise
the more objective and neutral tone of factual reporting.
However, political and ideological grounds can also be
found, especially for Kaleva’s critical portrayal of PS.
Since PS was portrayed so infrequently in Finnish
Euro crisis articles, it is not possible to make any statisti-
cally reliable conclusions about the subject. However, a
few recurring frames was possible to identify from the
data. The material found in 59 articles introduced ten
frames in which the interpretations of PS were delimited
by the media. Some of these frames were very specific
concerning, for example, Soini’s candidacy for the 2012
presidential elections. When these kinds of specialties
and overlaps between the frameswere eliminated, three
main frames could be defined, namely: (1) PS as a repre-
sentative of the opposition, (2) PS as a representative of
populism, and (3) PS as a representative of Euroscepti-
cism (see Table 2).
A single article might employ several frames, but usu-
ally one frame dominated the portrayal of PS. The most
common primary frame was that of ‘opposition’. The
‘populism’ frame was the second most popular, and ‘Eu-
roscepticism’ came third. However, ‘Euroscepticism’ was
evidentlymost common as a secondary frame. Thus, one
can argue that PS was usually presented as a represen-
tative of opposition or populist politics, although these
presentations were frequently accompanied by the Eu-
roscepticism frame. The opposition frame was comple-
mented by the Euroscepticism frame especially in news
stories, whereas editorials and commentaries favoured
a populist frame with a critical assessment of PS. Each
frame will be next introduced in more detail.
Opposition Frame. This frameemphasized PS as a rep-
resentative of domestic opposition politics. In opposition
frame PS was seen typically as a contender or challenge
to government rather than as a proponent of its own
Table 1. Finns Party (PS) in Euro crisis articles (n = 971).
Newspaper PS in articles (total Share from all Visibility of PS Assessment of PS
amount of articles) articles (%) in articles in articles
Kauppalehti 16 (309) 12% Minor Negative
(business paper)
Helsingin Sanomat 18 (312) 16% Modest Neutral
(leading daily, capital area)
Kaleva 20 (228) 19% Minor/modest Negative
(regional daily, Northern Finland)
Ilta-Sanomat 15 (122) 12% Sizeable Positive
(popular paper)
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agenda. The party was thus defined by what it is not
(i.e. a government participant). In consensus democra-
cies such as Finland government/opposition division is
one of the most important dimensions structuring the
party field and, therefore, it is not a surprise that this
frame was most common and used by all newspapers in-
cluded to the study, because PS was an opposition party
during all sample periods of 2010–2012.
Opposition frame was most common in news sto-
ries published by dailies. Especially Helsingin Sanomat
favoured this framing that was used also in such story
headlines as ‘Opposition accuses the government for
increasing the charges of Finland’ (3 August 2011) or
‘Opposition scolded the Prime Minister Katainen’ (3
July 2012). Opposition frame appeared several times in
Helsingin Sanomat news stories as neutral mentions of
PS (e.g. 8 May 2010; 3 August 2011).
However, quite often the opposition/government di-
vision was dramatized by using metaphors known from
sports and conflict narratives (cf. Joris, Puustinen, So-
bieraj, & d’Haenens, 2015). This was common also in
Helsingin Sanomat, in which the opposition was ‘furious’
with the schedule of parliamentary processing of collat-
eral agreement with Spain (19 July 2012) or when the
Prime Minister Katainen had to time after time ‘deny al-
legations’ (3 August 2011). Dramatizationwas evenmore
typical in other papers, in which ‘the government and
the opposition clashed’ (Kauppalehti 18 June 2012) or
the leader of PS Soini ‘attacked the government very
hard’ (Kaleva 9 November 2011). Usually attacker was
the opposition and the government was defender (e.g.
Ilta-Sanomat 7 October 2011).
Even if the opposition frame was most common
in the news stories, it was also used in other story
types highlighting the differences between the papers.
Whereas popular paper Ilta-Sanomat presented PS and
its leader Soini quite often positively as the represen-
tatives of the opposition, regional paper Kaleva made
usually completely different evaluations. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that even if Kaleva is announced to
be politically independent the strong position of the Cen-
tre Party in the region Kaleva is distributed has implica-
tions to the alignments of the paper. In Ilta-Sanomat PS
was a snappy opposition party, whose leader’s Euroscep-
tic blog writings were repeated almost as they were (28
November 2011), but in Kaleva PS was just a secondary
opposition party ‘accompanying Centre Party in its EU
criticism’ (3 August 2011). Thus, according to Kaleva the
Centre Party was the primary opposition party (10 Au-
gust 2011), and PS was often portrayed in negative or
critical light (e.g. 21 July 2012).
Populism Frame. Populism as such is a slippery con-
cept. Populism has been historically linked to very dif-
ferent left- and right-wing movements, totalitarian and
democratic systems as well as nationalist and liberalist
approaches (see Taggart, 2000). In many political cul-
tures and languages the term ‘populism’ carries rather
negative connotations (cf. Canovan, 2005, p. 75), even
though the etymological background of the word, deriv-
ing from the Latin noun ‘populus’ meaning ‘the people’,
gives it an emancipative or empowering signification (cf.
Williams, 1988, p. 66). Pejorative meanings of ‘empty
talk’ are common in accusations of someone being a
‘populist’, but other kinds of usages with more positive
connotations of democracy have also been connected to
populism (e.g. Canovan, 1999).
Mostly negative meanings of populism appeared in
populism frame of PS. Surprisingly, the positive mean-
ings of populism and PS representing ‘the people’ were
also sometimes used in newspapers that generally were
critical against the party. For example, in a commentary
writing of Kauppalehti, PS was presented as fresh air in
EU politics between the people and the elites (17 Au-
gust 2011), and also dailies noted Soini as a defender
of democracy when the Finnish government rushed the
parliamentary decision of EU loan programme for Spain
during parliament’s recess period (Kaleva 19 July 2012;
Helsingin Sanomat 19 July 2012).
However, positive approaches of populism frame
were most common in Ilta-Sanomat that quite often pre-
sented Eurosceptic PS as a representative of ‘the real
people’ opposing Europhilic political and economic elites.
Ilta-Sanomat, for example, published a web survey ask-
ing if the support Finland pays for Greece is too much or
not (3 May 2010). It was not a surprise that 94 percent
of over 50,000 respondents thought that the amount of
money was too much. In addition to the survey results,
Soini promoted his Eurosceptic views in the article. Pos-
itive framing of populism was used also in other articles
of Ilta-Sanomat presenting PS as a mediator of ‘the peo-
ple’ and challenger of the Euro elites (e.g. 7 November
2011). Contradiction compared to Helsingin Sanomat
was striking: the leading quality paper of the country al-
most avoided using the populism frame.
The reasonwhy populism framewas used so rarely in
Helsingin Sanomat derives from the most popular mean-
ings of the term in Finnish language. The term is used
often pejoratively, combining the meanings of populist
Table 2.Main frames of Finns Party (PS) in Euro crisis articles (n = 59).
Frame As a primary frame As a secondary frame Total
Opposition frame 24 15 29
Populism frame 16 17 23
Euroscepticism frame 10 24 34
Total 50 36 86
Media and Communication, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 2, Pages 1–10 6
rhetoric or style to ideological emptiness. To call some-
one a ‘populist’ has been a negative statement in Finnish
political discourse. This kind of pejorative use of pop-
ulism frame was popular in editorials and commentaries
of Kaleva and Kauppalehti, in which PS was most often
discussed as a troublemaker on the Finnish political field.
Especially Kaleva seemed to accuse PS of ‘populist’ Euro
policies in its editorials and commentaries (4 and 17 Au-
gust 2011; 13 November 2011; 26 June 2012; 21 July
2012). Kauppalehti also promoted this kind of approach
to PS (18 August 2011; 31 October 2011; 18 June 2012).
Also in the ‘big bang election’ media coverage es-
pecially editorials and commentaries presented PS as a
protest channel through which the voters could project
their disappointments. However, EU policy and anti-
immigration strategies of PS were criticized in these
articles as ‘populist rhetoric’ (Hatakka, 2012, pp. 297–
301), and some writers thought that PS might even
threat the very functionality of Finnish political system
(Hatakka, 2012, p. 317). In Euro crisis coverage these
kinds of evaluations were common especially on edito-
rials and commentaries published by Kaleva and Kaup-
palehti in 2010–2012.
Euroscepticism Frame. Euroscepticism frame goes
naturally hand in hand with PS because, as mentioned
earlier, the party has represented most consistently Eu-
rosceptic approach in Finnish political field during the
twenty-first century (Raunio, 2011). Therefore, in Eu-
roscepticism frame media echoed the self-definitions of
PS. Again, popular paper Ilta-Sanomat appliedmost com-
monly the positive approach to Euroscepticism and PS—
the stance indicated by an opinion poll asking if joining
to EMU had been a mistake or not (1 June 2012). Accord-
ing to the poll, only the supporters of PS thought that
Finland should not have been joined the EMU. Soini was
commenting the result in a story so that he was glad if PS
was the one and only Eurosceptic party in Finland.
Euroscepticism as a primary frame was most popu-
lar in Ilta-Sanomat, which gave in all most positive and
notable publicity to PS (cf. Harjuniemi & Herkman, 2013,
p. 59). Thus, PS and its leader Soini promoted in Ilta-
Sanomat directly their political agenda, which was not op-
pressed by opposition or populism frames. Soini argued
in Ilta-Sanomat that he had been right all the time when
warning about the support of the European banks (30
June 2012) orwhen the ‘Europhilic government’ had to ex-
plain away their EUpolicies (11August 2011; 12 July 2012).
The paper also quoted some other Eurosceptic commen-
tators, such as economist Stefan Törnqvist from Ålands-
banken, who predicted the breakdown of the Eurozone.
In other newspapers the Euroscepticism frame was
approached usually more neutrally than in Ilta-Sanomat.
In Helsingin Sanomat news stories, for example, also
other PS representatives than Soini, such as MP Vesa-
Matti Saarakkala (28 October 2011) and MEP Sampo
Terho (29 September 2011), criticised the government’s
EU policies. However, majority of Euroscepticism fram-
ings were secondary to the opposition frame that was
the primary frame of PS in Helsingin Sanomat. Thus, first
and foremost PS was presented as an opposition party
which criticises the government about its EU policies.
The use of Euroscepticism frame commonly as a sec-
ondary frame in Helsingin Sanomat and in some news
stories of Kaleva also can be explained partly by the sam-
pling. The sample focusing solely on articles discussing
Euro crisis emphasizes Euroscepticism as central topic of
PS’ opposition politics. In articles discussing PS outside
the Euro crisis, other topics would have probably domi-
nated. Critique of the campaign financing of themore es-
tablished parties, but also immigration, were common is-
sues in ‘big bang election’ coverages and promoted espe-
cially by PS and its leader Soini (Railo & Välimäki, 2012a).
These typical topics with a populist movement did not
come out so much in media coverage of the Euro crisis.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
To answer RQ1, the role of the Eurosceptic PS turned
out to be rather modest in determining media cover-
age of the 2010–2012 Euro crisis: only six percent of the
Euro crisis articles mentioned PS or its representatives.
In those articles, PS was primarily framed as a represen-
tative of the opposition or populism meaning a negative
or neutral tone accompanied its portrayal. However, Eu-
roscepticism was a common secondary frame and espe-
cially accompanied the opposition frame, indicating the
significance of PS as a public representative of Finnish
Euroscepticism.
The differences between the framings demonstrate
differences between newspaper types. The business pa-
per did not grant much attention to PS because it
mostly discussed the Euro crisis as an economic issue,
thus favouring economists and bankers as news sources
(cf. Arrese & Vara, 2015). In its rare articles that men-
tioned PS, the party was usually presented as a populist
troublemaker. In daily newspapers, PS was given more
visibility and discussed in a more neutral manner, even
if the amount of articles was not very substantial and PS
was portrayed negatively, especially in Kaleva.
The most significant difference between the news-
paper types was that between the quality newspapers
and the tabloid, which was the only newspaper to por-
tray PS positively and adopt a Eurosceptic approach. The
visibility given to PS was also remarkably greater in the
tabloid than in other papers: PS was mentioned in 12
percent of all Euro crisis articles and often portrayed
through flamboyant images of the party leader, Soini.
Therefore, this study supports previous studies indicat-
ing that the tabloid media serves populist and Euroscep-
tic audiencesmore eagerly than quality newspapers (Jun-
gar, 2010, pp. 215–216; Leconte, 2010, pp. 203–204;
Mazzoleni, 2003, p. 8).
Compared to themedia coverage of the big bang elec-
tions 2011 (RQ2), the attention given to PS appeared com-
pletely different: PS and Timo Soiniwere visible in election
campaigns in defining themedia agenda (Railo&Välimäki,
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2012a), but the agenda setting power of the party turned
out to be rather modest during the Euro crisis issue, al-
though the visibility of PS seemed to increase slightly af-
ter the elections. Generally, the Euro crisis coverage was
dominated by Euro-positive political leaders, the govern-
ment and economists, whereas representatives of civil so-
ciety were seldom mentioned or used as story sources
(Harjuniemi & Herkman, 2013, pp. 21–29). This accords
with other studies of actors who ‘inhabit the European
public sphere’ (Koopmans, 2007, pp. 203–206).
The sample period of this study ends in 2012. The
consequences of the Euro crisis have since that struck
Finland extremely hard. Thus, the archive of Helsingin
Sanomat indicates that theremight bemore room for Eu-
roscepticism in Finnish media coverage after 2013. Key-
nesian approaches and other alternatives to austerity
have been discussed more often than during the sample
period—when the Euro elite dominated debates. How-
ever, there is no evidence that PS would have gained
more attention in those debates either. Since that PS has
been profiled rather by its public criticism of immigra-
tion and by scandals that some of their representatives
have faced.
Therefore, the study implies that the relationship be-
tween the populist movement and the media (RQ3), de-
pends on many other variables than thematic issues such
as Euroscepticism, which seems to be still quite marginal
in Finnish mainstream media (cf. Taggart & Szczerbiak,
2002). Themost important factor in this relationship is the
position of the populist party in a domestic political field.
Thus, it is necessary to consider if the party is marginal or
not in the political arena, whether it is in opposition or
in government, in its insurgent phase or established—all
these factors impact heavily on the overall media atten-
tion given to it (seeHerkman, 2015). Therefore, it is proba-
ble that the dominant frames of opposition and populism
have changed when PS became established and joined
the government after the 2015 elections.
The media factor itself is another major variable
defining the relationship between the populist party
and the media. Obviously, the tabloid media adopts Eu-
rosceptic sentiment more eagerly than quality media.
Criticism for and against Euroscepticism is also more
common in commentaries, editorials and columns than
in news stories that tend to be more neutral. However,
political affiliations between themedia and domestic po-
litical parties appear to direct media coverage toward
particular framings, even if the news media proclaims
to be politically independent. For instance, the commit-
ment to the Centre Party in Kaleva’s editorials and com-
mentaries indicates the strong impact of the party in the
region in which the paper is published. Hence, the audi-
ence addressed by the particularmedia organisationmay
also greatly explain media frames regarding Euroscepti-
cism and populism.
However, even more important media factor derives
from journalistic routines. Several studies in Finland and
elsewhere have indicated that the media attention em-
phasizes leading politicians, such as key Ministers, ex-
plaining why PS was not a prominent agent in Euro crisis
coverage during its opposition period (see Bos, Van der
Brug, & De Vreese, 2011; Suikkanen, Holma, & Raittila,
2012). More specifically, as Bennett’s (1990) ‘indexing
hypothesis’ supposes, the mainstream media organiza-
tions usually adopt the hegemonic views of government
debate, and challenging viewpoints are therefore intro-
ducedmerely insomuch as they are emerged in these ‘of-
ficial circles’ (p. 106). This is especially true in such coun-
tries as Finland whose media can even today be called
‘politics friendly’ (cf. Van Dalen, 2012).
The explicit difference between the Euro crisis cov-
erages during the election campaign and times other
also support the indexing hypothesis, which is intended
to apply the everyday news accounts rather than cover-
age of such specific events as elections ‘that may have
a normative-ritual order of their own’ (Bennett, 1990,
p. 107). Thus, during the election campaign, the con-
flict frame enabled PS to challenge the established Euro-
positive political elites that in other times dominated the
everyday news stream. Therefore, it seems that to be-
come a prominent point of view in the news media, Eu-
roscepticism has to be promoted by established govern-
ment politicians who either challenge the other decision-
making elites by this view or adopt Euroscepticism as
their hegemonic idea on European issues. For the mo-
ment, this does not seem to be a probable option in
Finnish public discourse.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Academy of Finland (un-
der grant 259393) and ‘The Euro Crisis, Media Coverage,
and Perceptions of Europe within the EU’ project, orga-
nized by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism
at the University of Oxford; the Finnish sub-study was
funded by the Helsingin Sanomat Foundation.
Conflict of Interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
References
Arrese, Á., & Vara, A. (2015). Divergent perspectives? Fi-
nancial newspapers and the general interest press. In
R. Picard (Ed.), The Euro crisis in the media (pp. 149–
175). London: I. B. Tauris.
Arter, D. (2012). ‘Big Bang’ elections and party system
change in Scandinavia: Farewell to the ‘Enduring
Party System’? Parliamentary Affairs, 65, 822–844.
Bennett, L.W. (1990). Toward a theory of press-state rela-
tions in the United States. Journal of Communication,
40(2), 103–125.
Borah, P. (2011). Conceptual issues in framing theory: A
systemic examination of a decade’s literature. Jour-
nal of Communication, 61(2), 246–263.
Media and Communication, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 2, Pages 1–10 8
Borg, S. (2012). Perussuomalaiset. In S. Borg (Ed.),
Muutosvaalit 2011 (pp. 191–210). Helsinki:
Oikeusministeriö.
Bos, L., Van der Brug, W., & De Vreese, C. (2011). How
the media shape perceptions of right-wing populist
leaders. Political Communication, 28(2), 182–206.
Caiani, M., & Conti, N. (2014). In the name of the Peo-
ple: The Euroscepticism of Italian radical right. Per-
spectives on European Politics and Society, 15(2),
183–197.
Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the People! Populism and
the two faces of democracy. Political Studies, 47(1),
2–16.
Canovan, M. (2005). The People. Cambridge: Polity Press.
De Beus, J. (2010). The European Union and the public
sphere. In R. Koopmans & P. Statham (Eds.), The mak-
ing of a European public sphere (pp. 13–33). Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
De Vreese, C. H., Jochen, P., & Holli, S. A. (2001). Fram-
ing politics at the launch of the Euro: A cross-national
comparative study of frames in the news. Political
Communication, 18(2), 107–122.
Ekman, J. (2010). Euroskepticism: Olika former av EU-
kritik. In J. Ekman & J. Linde (Eds.), Politik, protest,
populism—Deltagande på nya villkor (pp. 92–130).
Malmö: Liber.
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of
a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication,
43(4), 51–58.
Eurobarometer. (2015). Standard Eurobarometer 83.
Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/
archives/eb/eb83/eb83_en.htm
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the orga-
nization of experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Grönlund, K., & Westinen, J. (2012). Puoluevalinta. In
S. Borg (Ed.), Muutosvaalit 2011 (pp. 156–190).
Helsinki: Oikeusministeriö.
Harjuniemi, T., & Herkman, J. (2013). Eurokriisi suomalai-
sissa sanomalehdissä 2010–2012. Helsinki: Helsingin
yliopisto, sosiaalitieteiden laitos.
Harjuniemi, T., Herkman, J., & Ojala, M. (2015). Eurokrii-
sin politisoituminen suomalaisissa sanomalehdissä.
Media & Viestintä, 38(1), 1–22.
Hatakka, N. (2012). Perussuomalaisuuden kuva pääkirjoi-
tus- ja kolumnijulkisuudessa. In V. Pernaa & E. Railo
(Eds.), Jytky. Eduskuntavaalien 2011 mediajulkisuus
(pp. 294–322). Turku: Turun yliopisto/Kirja-Aurora.
Heikkilä, H. (2007). Beyond ‘in so far as’ questions: Con-
tingent social imaginaries of the European public
sphere. European Journal of Communication, 22(4),
427–441.
Herkman, J. (2016). Articulations of populism: The
Nordic case. Cultural Studies. doi:10.1080/09502386.
2016.1232421
Herkman, J. (2015). The life cycle model and press cov-
erage of Nordic populist parties. Journalism Studies.
doi:10.1080/1461670X.2015.1066231
Herkman, J., & Harjuniemi, T. (2015). Unity or hetero-
geneity: The promise of a European public sphere? In
R. Picard (Ed.), The Euro crisis in the media (pp. 221–
235). London: I. B. Tauris.
Hix, S. (2008). What’s wrong with the European Union
and how to fix it. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Wilson, C. J. (2002). Does left/
right structure party positions on European integra-
tion? Comparative Political Studies, 38(8), 965–989.
Joris, W., Puustinen, L., Sobieraj, K., & d’Haenens, L.
(2015). The battle for the Euro: Metaphors and
frames in the Euro crisis news. In R. Picard (Ed.), The
Euro crisis in the media. Journalistic coverage of eco-
nomic crisis and European institutions (pp. 125–145).
London: L. B. Tauris.
Jungar, A.-C. (2010). Populismens återkomst: Hot eller
löfte? In J. Ekman & J. Linde (Eds.), Politik, protest,
populism—Deltagande på nya villkor (pp. 202–224).
Malmö: Liber.
Koopmans, R. (2007). Who inhabits the European pub-
lic sphere? Winners and losers, supporters and op-
ponents in Europeanised political debates. European
Journal of Political Research, 46(2), 183–210.
Koopmans, R., Erbe, J., & Meyer, M. F. (2010). The Eu-
ropeanization of public spheres: Comparisons across
issues, time, and countries. In R. Koopmans & P.
Statham (Eds.), The making of a European public
sphere (pp. 63–96). Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Leconte, C. (2010). Understanding Euroscepticism. Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lubbers, M., & Scheepers, P. (2005). Political versus in-
strumental Euroscepticism: Mapping Euroscepticism
in European countries regions. European Union Poli-
tics, 6(2), 223–242.
Luedtke, A. (2005). European integration, public opinion
and immigration policy. EuropeanUnion Politics, 6(2),
83–112.
Mazzoleni, G. (2003). The media and the growth of neo-
populism in contemporary democracies. In G. Maz-
zoleni, J. Stewart, & B. Horsfield (Eds.), Themedia and
neo-populism: A contemporary comparative analysis
(pp. 1–20). Westport: Praeger.
Mörä, T. (1999). EU-journalismin anatomia. Mediasi-
sältöjä muokanneet tekijät ennen kansanäänestystä
1994. Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto.
Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Paloheimo, H. (2012). Populismi Puoluejärjestelmän ve-
denjakajana. In S. Borg (Ed.), Muutosvaalit 2011 (pp.
324–345). Helsinki: Oikeusministeriö.
Pernaa, V. (2012). Vaalikamppailu mediassa. In S. Borg
(Ed.), Muutosvaalit 2011 (pp. 29–42). Helsinki:
Oikeusministeriö.
Pew Research. (2013). The new sick man of Europe: The
European Union. Retrieved from http://www.pew
global.org/2013/05/13/the-new-sick-man-of-europe
-the-european-union
Media and Communication, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 2, Pages 1–10 9
Picard, R. (Ed.). (2015). The Euro crisis in media: Journal-
istic coverage of economic crisis and European insti-
tutions. London: I. B. Tauris.
Pirro, A. (2014). Populist radical right parties in Central
and Eastern Europe: The different context and issues
of the prophets of the patria. Government & Opposi-
tion, 49(4), 600–629.
Rahkonen, J. (2011). Perussuomalaisten ruumiinavaus.
Onko työväen protestipuolueen kannatus saavut-
tanut vielä ylärajaansa? Yhteiskuntapolitiikka, 76(4),
425–435.
Railo, E. (2012). Euroopan unionin talouskriisin julki-
suus—kritiikistä konsensukseen. In V. Pernaa & E.
Railo (Eds.), Jytky. Eduskuntavaalien 2011 media-
julkisuus (pp. 231–263). Turku: Turun yliopisto/Kirja-
Aurora.
Railo, E., & Välimäki, M. (2012a). Vaalikevään media-
agenda. In V. Pernaa & E. Railo (Eds.), Jytky. Eduskun-
tavaalien 2011mediajulkisuus (pp. 32–66). Turku: Tu-
run yliopisto/Kirja-Aurora.
Railo, E., & Välimäki, M. (2012b). Kamppailu julkisuu-
den hallinnasta. In V. Pernaa & E. Railo (Eds.), Jytky.
Eduskuntavaalien 2011 mediajulkisuus (pp. 100–
161). Turku: Turun yliopisto/Kirja-Aurora.
Raunio, T. (2011). Missä EU, siellä ongelma: Populistinen
Eurooppa-vastaisuus Suomessa. In M. Wiberg (Ed.),
Populismi. Kriitinen arvio (pp. 197–220). Helsinki:
Edita.
Schuck, A., Azrout, R., Boomgaarden, H., Elenbaas, M.,
Van Spanje, J., Vliegenhart, R., & De Vreese, C. (2011).
Media visibility and framing of the European Parlia-
mentary elections 2009. In M. Maier, J. Strömbäck,
& L. L. Kaid (Eds.), Political communication in Euro-
pean Parliamentary elections (pp. 175–196). Farn-
ham: Ashgate.
Silke, A., & Maier, M. (2011). National parties as politi-
cizers of EU integration? Party campaign communica-
tion in the run-up to the 2009 European Parliament
election. European Union Politics, 12(3), 431–453.
Strömbäck, J., Negrine, R., Hopmann, D. N., Maier, M.,
Jalali, C., Berganza, R., . . . & Róka, J. (2011). The
mediatization and framing of European Parliamen-
tary election campaigns. In M. Maier, J. Strömbäck,
& L. L. Kaid (Eds.), Political communication in Euro-
pean Parliamentary elections (pp. 161–174). Farn-
ham: Ashgate.
Suikkanen, R., Holma, A., & Raittila, P. (2012). Muut-
tumaton uutinen? Suomalaisen uutismedian vuo-
siseuranta 2007–2012. Tampere: COMET.
Sundberg, J. (1999). The enduring Scandinavian party sys-
tem. Scandinavian Political Studies, 22(3), 221–241.
Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Buckingham: Open Univer-
sity Press.
Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2002). Europeanisation,
Euroscepticism and party systems: Party-based Eu-
roscepticism in the candidate states of Central and
Eastern Europe. Perspectives on European Politics
and Society, 3(1), 23–41.
Taylor, P. (2008). The end of European integration:
Anti-Europeanism examined. Abingdon and Oxford:
Routledge.
Trenz, H.-J. (2007). ‘Quo vadis Europe?’ Quality newspa-
pers struggling for European unity. In J. E. Fossum& P.
Schlesinger (Eds.), The European Union and the pub-
lic sphere: A communicative space in themaking? (pp.
89–109). Abingdon: Routledge.
VanDalen, A. (2012). Structural bias in cross-national per-
spective: How political systems and journalism cul-
tures influence government dominance in the news.
The International Journal of Press/Politics, 17(1),
32–55.
Van Spanje, J., & De Vreese, C. (2014). Europhile media
and Eurosceptic voting: Effects of news media cover-
age on Eurosceptic voting in the 2009 European Par-
liamentary elections. Political Communication, 31(2),
325–354.
Wiberg, M. (2011). Mitä populismi on? In M. Wiberg
(Ed.), Populismi. Kriitinen arvio (pp. 11–21). Helsinki:
Edita.
Williams, R. (1988). Keywords: A vocabulary of culture
and society. London: Fontana.
About the Author
Juha Herkman (PhD) is an Academy Research Fellow in the Department of Social Research at the Uni-
versity of Helsinki, Finland. His current research project explores the relationship between populism
and the media in the Nordic countries. Herkman has published several academic textbooks in Finnish,
and articles in such journals as Cultural Studies,Media, Culture & Society, Javnost—The Public, Nordi-
com Review, Journalism Studies and Convergence: The International Journal of Research into NewMe-
dia Technologies.
Media and Communication, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 2, Pages 1–10 10
